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Two salient features of the present international scenario are the large number of 
negotiations underway at the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels and the repeated 
financial crises in emerging markets. 
The multiplicity of negotiations itself is becoming a source of uncertainty for economic 
policy making. It is a taxing process for many developing countries, where the institutional 
infrastructure supporting negotiations is weak and the staff of negotiators does not have the 
necessary size and qualifications. As a result, national interests are often not properly 
promoted and it is sometimes difficult even to define clearly what the national interest is. 
The negotiations involving the financial sector and capital markets in general are no 
exception in this regard. It is not clear whether the ongoing negotiations in different fora 
will deliver an appropriate global result from the point of view of developing countries' 
interest'. Indeed, developing countries do not even have a voice in the discussions on the 
emerging international financial architecture (IFA) in some of the relevant fora. For the 
international financial architecture to be more friendly to developing countries, the new 
framework should help to smooth volatility in financial conditions and to diversify national 
risk; avoid sudden interruptions in the flows of capital; and underpin an amount of flows 
that is consistent with sustainable growth. 
Examples of financial crises in developing countries in the context of globalization 
abound: the failure of Southern Cone financial liberalization attempts in the early eighties, 
and the series of financial/macroeconomic crises following the Tequila effect in the late 
nineties (the crises in Asia, Russia, Brazil, Argentina, and Turkey). In the case of the 
Southern Cone, the failure was attributed to a problem of sequencing, an inconsistency 
between domestic financial liberalization, the lack of sound prudential regulations, and the 
opening of the capital account. In the nineties, the unexpected financial crisis in successful 
Korea was ascribed to weak domestic regulations and supervision capabilities, flimsy 
corporate governance, and volatile capital flows (Yoshitomi, 2000). 
All these crises share a characteristic: the "perverse" interaction between the domestic 
financial architecture (DFA) and the IFA. They suggest that, since the process of building 
institutions for the financially globalized world has an international and a national 
dimension, there must be a minimum of coherence between the two. If a new IFA is to be 
built, a new DFA must be designed as well. 
UNCTAD (2001) is an excellent survey of the issues associated with current IFA negotiations. Also see 
Ocampo (2001) and Miller (1999). 
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This paper's main motivation is to contribute to a better understanding of the IFAJ DFA 
interactions and of their effects on financial stability and development. The paper is based 
on two hypotheses. First, the framework regulating financial intermediation (i.e. the DFA) 
in a given economy should not be conceived independently of the developments in 
international markets and institutions. This applies to the design, reform, and management 
of regulations. Second, to make financial crises in developing countries less likely, the 
emerging IFA must be consistent with the DFA and must take into account some key 
characteristics of developing economies: the higher volatility of the macroeconomic and 
financial environment; the underdevelopment of the market structure (imperfections, 
missing markets, high transactions costs); the weakness of institutions; and (as a 
consequence) the reduced number of countercyclical instruments at the disposal of 
authorities. 
Examination of these two hypotheses allows us to address some fundamental questions 
about the emerging IFA. What does it "add up to" from the point of view of developing 
countries' goals of growth and successful integration in the global economy? Does it make 
the international financial system more stable/efficient/transparent/"fair"? Is the IFA 
"neutral" with respect to changes in risk, return and structure or are shifts within them 
important? Is an imperfect and poorly implemented IFA system still an improvement over 
no system at all? Obviously, we do not intend to address all these questions in depth, but 
we believe that the evidence we discuss in this paper is relevant to many of them. 
The rest of this paper comprises three sections. The first section develops a framework 
to examine IFAIDFA linkages and interactions; defines what we mean by IFA and DFA; 
and reviews the recent developments concerning the IFA. Emphasis is placed on the 
aspects which are most relevant for emerging economies and for Latin America in 
particular. The second section presents a case study to illustrate the issues raised in the 
previous section. Argentina is selected as the point of reference because the DFA and the 
structural features of the country are especially useful to illuminating specific points of the 
analysis.2 The last section of the paper draws some lessons that can be useful in elaborating 
a consistent negotiation strategy in the different fora and in designing a DFA that is 
consistent with both the developments in the IFA and with the goal of a further financial 
deepening. 
II. The Emerging IFA and Developing Countries' DFA 
In the aftermath of the Asia-led set of financial crises, the phrase "international 
financial architecture" is now routinely used to connote a host of issues related to 
2 In a context of increasing financial deepening and global integration, the country suffered a series of 
domestic and external shocks. Thus, its time series presents a degree of variance which is very helpful to 
illustrate our arguments. Additionally, the country holds ongoing negotiations with the IMF. 
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international financial management and governance. There is no commonly understood 
definition of IFA. A narrow interpretation would focus on the role of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and lender countries before, during and after a financial crisis, 
typically in a developing country. Broader interpretations, of the sort we utilize in this 
paper, put several other aspects of the international financial system within the ambit of 
IFA. Narrow or broad, what is increasingly clear but less well understood is the implication 
that the emerging IFA has for domestic financial systems, management and governance. 
We include regional agreements in our analysis below. Countries involved in regional 
agreements need to take into account the restrictions and the relation between deeper 
financial regional integration and commitments at the multilateral and regional levels. The 
arrow pointing downward from the IFA rectangle highlights the fact that international 
norms and institutions limit the set of strategies available for developing economies to 
become more financially integrated. For example, a failure to tackle criminality can hinder 
negotiations on liberalization of financial services. 
The DFA includes an array of legal norms, regulations, policies, and practices which 
influence the management and governance of financial institutions and, hence, their 
economic conduct and performance. As in the case of the IFA, we can adopt a narrow and a 
broad interpretation of DFA. In the narrow interpretation DFA includes only those aspects 
that are strictly related to the financial sector, while a broader interpretation includes 
elements associated with the macroeconomic regime. Given the importance of 
macroeconomic issues in developing countries, a broad interpretation is appropriate. 
Accordingly, at the bottom of the scheme, we represent the DFA as the union of two 
rectangles: one containing the elements of the financial infrastructure and the other showing 
the components of the macroeconomic regime which are relevant for the broadly-defined 
DFA. 
The changes associated with the emerging IFA can potentially have a sizable impact 
on key areas in developing economies. Specifically, changes in the IFA can directly affect 
the developmcnt a;cl stability of the financial sector, the macroeconomic regime, and the 
process of integration with international capital markets. To be able to manage this process, 
the authorities must be prepared to introduce the necessary changes in the DFA. In this 
section, we examine the interactions between changes in the IFA and the DFA. We 
emphasize three points: (1) the identification of the components of IFA and DFA and the 
linkages between them; (2) how the IFA/DFA interactions may affect the structure, conduct 
and governance of the domestic financial sector and its relations with firms and investors; 
and (3) how changes in the IFA and DFA can trigger effects that spill over into the 
macroeconomy and the process of deeper integration with international capital markets. 
1. A Schematic View of the IFAIDFA relationships 
The DFA and IFA are, in the first place, networks of institutions. Hence, the 
argument that they matter for the performance of the financial sector and the 
macroeconomy implies that institutions are not neutral with respect to economic efficiency 
and that transaction costs matter. In a world where the Coase Theorem (Coase, 1960) holds 
this would not be a helpful hypothesis. If agents are able to enter into contracts as they 
please, firms and investors can always reach efficient arrangements. They can even contract 
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around the law. But this idealized world is distant from the realities of emerging countries. 
The only way to enforce contracts is through legal actions of some kind and this can be 
costly. One factor that features financial intermediation in developing countries is that the 
enforcement of contracts and, particularly, protecting investor rights, is very costly. The 
judicial process can be slow and corrupt; supervision of the banking and financial sectors 
can be weak; there is a lack of transparency; and information tends to be less reliable. 
Recent research suggests that legal rules protecting investors matter, that institutions do not 
adapt sufficiently to changes and innovations in the financial sector, and that differences in 
institutional structure matter in understanding patterns and levels of investment (Carlin and 
Mayer, 2001; and Johnson, 2000). 
A second factor influencing financial development in emerging markets is high 
volatility. When uncertainty is high it is very difficult to describe ex ante the future states of 
nature and to quantify risk by means of (an accurately estimated) probability distribution 
(Kimbal, 2000). This means that data may have little forecasting value. Under these 
circumstances, to design and agree upon the terms of financial contracts will be more 
difficult and, as a consequence, many transactions will not be carried out. The ultimate 
result is weak and shallow financial markets and an overall financial market structure with 
some parts missing (i.e markets for long-run debt, derivative markets, entire sectors of the 
economy absent in the stock exchange). 
The lack of financial deepening created by weak institutions and volatility makes risk 
management very difficult. Firms and investors cannot properly hedge, shift or mitigate 
risks because the necessary instruments simply do not exist. Indeed, a critical factor 
increasing volatility in emerging economies is the difficulty for the private agents and 
policy makers to resort to international markets to diversify national risk. Global shocks 
become very difficult to absorb and the growth process becomes much more volatile. 
Typically, this situation is aggravated by the lack of diversification of the productive 
structure (Fanelli and Medhora, 2001). 
Tise faturcs of c'ircrging coonomies suggest that there may be a perverse feed-back 
channel between weak financial markets and volatility. Volatility is high because risk 
cannot be properly managed in shallow financial markets and these markets are shallow 
because volatility is high. Improving the DFA and IFA and ensuring its consistency is 
critical in this regard. A better designed DFA can significantly ameliorate the institutional 
deficiencies which generate financial market failures. The IFA can make a substantial 
contribution to increase the authorities' ability to manage national risks (by increasing the 
number of countercyclical and shock-absorbing instruments available to them). 
Furthermore, heeding DFAIIFA interactions is also relevant to volatility for another 
reason. The possible inconsistency between the IFA and the DFA as a result of piece-meal 
reforms and international negotiations could in itself become a source of uncertainty. 
Given the large number of elements involved in the IFA/DFA interactions, Scheme I 
organizes the analysis. At the center of the Scheme are three ovals showing three policy 
goals closely associated with the IFA/DFA linkages and interactions: achieving deeper 
integration with the global economy, developing financial intermediation in a stable 
environment, and preserving macroeconomic stability. It is via their effects on these goals, 
that the IFA and the DFA have an influence on the conditions for sustainable growth. 
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INSERT SCHEME I 
The three ovals overlap to call attention to the interdependence between 
macroeconomic stability, financial conditions, and deeper integration. The recent 
experience of emerging countries shows that deeper integration with global capital markets 
can be a valuable instrument in fostering growth and competitiveness. But the process can 
be painful and may jeopardize both financial and macroeconomic stability. Indeed, it was in 
the context of the increasing globalization of the nineties that the term "twin crises" was 
coined to describe the interdependence between financial and currency crises (Kaminsky 
and Reinhart, 1999). 
The two arrows joining the DFA and the deeper integration oval represent the 
interactions between DFA and IFA which arise as the process of global integration 
advances. For example: under capital account convertibility the need to adopt rules and 
regulations that allow a country to compete internationally will increase; financial systems 
will have to be adapted to absorb global shocks; the authorities will increasingly take into 
account that poor fundamentals make the economy more vulnerable to global shocks; and 
that domestically created shocks can jeopardize normal access to international capital 
markets. 
2. The Emerging International Financial Architecture 
Much of what is termed IFA lies in the realm of proposal (and sometimes wishful 
thinking) rather than actual or probable fact. While taking a broad view of IFA, we avoid 
the huge literature that has now emerged on proposals to reform the international financial 
system3. Irs::i, v;: focus on actvl or likely developments in this area which are relevant 
for our analysis of IFAIDFA interactions. To this purpose we now review briefly the 
elements included in the IFA rectangle of Scheme I. 
The Asian set of crises was not unique in either their causes, reaction of the 
international financial institutions (IFIs), other lenders and international community, or 
their consequences. But their location, timing and magnitude brought to the fo-e the role of 
volatile capital flows in causing, and the prescriptions of the IFIs, particularly the IMF, in 
resolving the crises. A first component, then, of any definition of IFA is the appropriate 
capital account regime, and the need to understand and manage international capital flows. 
But predating this is the question of how banks assess risk, and make provision for it - 
the Base! standards for capital adequacy. Also pre-dating the Asian crises and affecting 
market structure and efficiency of the financial sector are the discussions and developments 
For references see UNClAD (2001). 
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centred on the financial sector component of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS). 
More recently, the G7, G20 and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) have served as bases for emerging accords on tax havens and money 
laundering. 
Finally, the emergence of electronic money and trading systems has important 
implications for market structure and efficiency, for systemic stability, on the conduct of 
monetary policy and on central bank functions. 
We next describe the salient features of and developments in each of these issues. 
a. Volatility and Crisis: Management and Prevention 
This is the area where perhaps expectations were and remain highest and where actual 
and prospective developments are modest at best. The issue turns on three related points - 
supply of capital issues, managing (short-term) capital and the role of the IFIs. 
Least progress has been made on the supply side issues. Regulation of the sources of 
capital remains in national hands, in source countries, and the more risky and volatile sorts 
of capital, such as hedge funds and other short-term lending, continue to operate on the 
basis that the inherent risk of the investment is the best regulator of its size and nature. 
This leads even some industry insiders to sound a warning (Biggs, 2001) and call for, at the 
very least, more effective self-regulation on the part of the industry. 
Payment standstills and Collective Action Clauses (CACs) are being discussed at the 
G20 and G7. Although it is difficult to assess the impact of a policy that does not yet exist, 
recent evidence suggests that both approaches could provide benefits to borrowers and 
lenders alike, provided the wherewithal to move away from current ad hoc and unilateral 
SU1LiGiS e;tcc1. 
On managing short-term capital, far-reaching proposals such as the Tobin Tax remain 
non-starters in the quarters that matter. Domestic versions, which arguably have been used 
successfully in Chile, Colombia and Malaysia, may be seen as part of the arsenal that 
countries possess to stabilize their economies and alter the composition of capital inflows. 
But where they are used and where not depends on the status of a country. The analytical 
debate has therefore focussed on balancing the trinity of capital account regime, exchange 
rate regime and monetary policy. 
It is difficult to assess the extent to which the critiques of the IFIs in the aftermath of 
the Asian crises have been effective. Failure to make progress on some of the issues 
requiring collective action (such as standstills and CAC5) is due to a number of factors and 
not an IFI responsibility alone. Misdiagnozing the malady and therefore mistreating it - a 
key charge in the Asian case - remains a highly contentious issue. At the very least, the 
responses to the recent Argentinean and Turkish crises suggest that rescue packages are of a 
smaller order of magnitude. But the policy prescriptions remain largely conventional. A 
concrete outcome of the Asian crises has been the establishment of fora and processes to 
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enhance the availability of economic data, transparency of economic policies and a lightly 
co-ordinated approach to oversee developments in the international macroeconomy. 
The Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems of the central banks of the GlO 
countries (CPSS) published in December 1999 a Report containing the so-called Core 
Principles For Systemically Important Payment Systems (BIS 1999). Brazil but not 
Argentina participated in the Task Force that produced the Report. These Principles, ten in 
all, are deliberately general, and serve as guides rather than rules to strengthening the 
financial and payments systems in countries. As a consequence of the reaction to the first 
Report, subsequent texts on implementation have been produced, and are detailed and 
useful. However, the buy-in process is limited and voluntary. A parallel committee, also 
based at the Bank For International Settlements (BIS), the Committee on the Global 
Financial System (CGFS), is also concerned with working with central banks to monitor 
financial markets and promote policies than enhance their stability. This, too, is a limited 
group with no enforcement mechanism other than the force of its arguments, a point that 
may also be made about the BIS-based Financial Stability Forum. 
The IMP, in conjunction with the BIS, has designed a Code of Good Practices on 
Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies and a Code of Good Practices on Fiscal 
Transparency. The focus here, too, is on promoting best practices through a set of general 
guidelines accompanied by implementation advice. 
The intention is for standards and codes to be developed in a wide range of areas 
including banking regulation and supervision, securities and insurance regulation, 
accounting, auditing, bankruptcy and corporate governance. Reports on the observance of 
these are published by the IMF and World Bank, and form part of the monitoring process of 
program countries. It follows that observance is more enforceable (and enforced) in 
borrowing countries than in lending countries, and within borrowing countries in program 
countries than in non-program countries. 
T1 netJ for widcsprrrd access to re1iabe, tr'elv and useful data hs underscored all 
recent financial crises. As a result, in 1996 the IMP developed the Special Data 
Dissemination Standard (SDDS) for countries having or seeking access to international 
financial markets. (The accompanying General Data Dissemination System, GDDS, is 
designed for the others.) Approximately 50 countries including Argentina have subscribed 
to the SDDS, which requires data to be organized in a certain format and posted on the 
web. 
b. Risk Assessment and Capital Adequacy 
The Base! Capital Accord of 1988 ("Base! 1") was the first consistent multilateral 
attempt to develop a more uniform risk assessment and capital adequacy framework for the 
international banking system. What began as a process for the internationally active banks 
in the 12 advanced countries that comprise the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
now touches the domestic and international operations of banks in over 100 countries. At 
the core of Base! 1 is a common method to qualify capital, a common risk-based framework 
within which bank assets may be valued, and the 8% reserve requirement of qualifying 
capital to aggregate risk-weighted assets. 
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Basel 1 was criticized for the manner in which it measured risk, and for its potentially 
credit-contracting nature for many banks particularly large diversified ones. The Asian 
Crises also highlighted three other weaknesses in Basel 1: the need to extend it to 
contribute to financial stability in emerging markets; the need to cover short-term interbank 
lending, a major source of capital volatility, in the risk assessment framework; and more 
generally, to make processes like the one behind Basel 1 more representative of the global 
financial community. 
Base! 2, unveiled in June 1999, goes some way in building on Base! 1. It sharpens the 
categories of risk and pays particular attention to "operational risk" defined as "the risk of 
direct or indirect loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and 
systems, or from external events." Minimum capital adequacy is now more closely linked 
to a weighted system of risk. Assessing and weighting the risk may be conducted by 
internal-ratings based approaches used (only) by the largest banks. Alternately, and 
controversially, the proposal calls for a more standardized approach that uses the ratings of 
credit agencies. 
Basel 2 is currently undergoing a process of review from the international banking, 
indeed financial, sector and a final document is expected to be produced by the end of 
2002. Implementation has already been pushed back from 2004 to late 2005. The test for 
the adequacy of Basel 2 would be: does it temper lending during boom (more generally, 
does it promote counter-cyclical lending behaviour? Is it easily and transparently applied 
(or applicable) to all internationally active banks? Does it make the international financial 
system less prone to crises? Clearly, the answers to these questions are not in, and the 
challenge to make the Basel process more effective and more inclusive remains to be met. 
c. Market Structure, Market Efficiency and Trade in Financial Services 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is the first multilateral 
agremnt to provid legally enforceable rigl'ts to tra'e in all services. It has a built-in 
commitment to continuous liberalization through periodic negotiations. The OATS is 
based on several basic principles. First, it covers all services except those provided in the 
exercise of governmental authority. Second, there should be no discrimination between 
other signatories to the Agreement (the so-called most-favoured-nation principle.) 
However, exceptions from the MFN obligation are permitted, for up to ten years, in order to 
give favourable treatment to some countries than to the generality. Third, laws and 
regulations governing trade in services should be transparent. And fourth, progressive 
liberalization is allowed for within the context of a OATS offer. 
Still, exceptions to these principles are allowed, and fall under two groups. First, 
governments can choose the services in which they make market access and national 
treatment commitments. Second, they can limit the degree of market access and national 
treatment they provide. For the purposes of the GATS, financial services are defined as the 
following: Insurance and related services: life and non-life insurance services; reinsurance 
and retrocession; insurance intermediation, such as broking and agency services; services 
auxiliary to insurance. Banking and other financial services excluding insurance: 
acceptance of deposits; lending of all types including consumer credit, mortgage credit, 
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factoring and financing of commercial transactions; financial leasing; all payment and 
money transmission services; guarantees and commitment; trading in money market 
instruments, foreign exchange, derivatives, exchange rate and interest rate instruments such 
as swaps and forward rate agreements, securities, other negotiable instruments and other 
assets such as gold; participation in issues of new securities; money broking; asset 
management such as portfolio management or pension fund management; settlement and 
clearing services for financial assets; provision and transfer of financial information and 
financial data processing; advisory and other auxiliary financial services. 
The core of the GATS is the specific commitments, which are made by member 
countries. Each Member must first determine which sectors or activities it wishes to open 
(thus accepting the national treatment and MFN principles for those sectors), and then 
determines the nature of limitations and exceptions that it wishes to maintain. Article XII 
allows for the usual restrictions on trade in services in the event of serious balance of 
payments problems, while the Annex on Financial Services makes clear that given their 
particular nature, Members can continue to exercise considerable authority over their 
financial sectors for "prudential" reasons such as the protection of investors, depositors and 
policy holders, the integrity of the financial system or the conduct of monetary policy. 
Finally, an Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services sets out an 
alternative approach to that covered by the provisions of Part III of the GATS (on market 
access and national treatment), by specifying alternative formulas of market liberalization 
in the financial services sector. 
Almost all World Trade Organization (WTO) members have made commitments in the 
"core" financial services - insurance, banking and securities. A smaller number have done 
so in insurance intermediation and the provision and transfer of financial information; only 
half have made any in derivatives trading. 
Developing countries, in particular, have to balance the objectives of market efficiency 
nd con titicn with co:sidcrations of rncro-'cononic stahihty and. financial 
development. In many cases, these are conflicting objectives, made more complicated by 
the fact that offers in this area form part of the broader set of issues related to international 
trade negotiations, including the posturing involved in setting up another comprehensive 
Round of trade talks. 
d. Tackling Criminality 
Although work in this area pre-dates the Asian crises, it is not until recently that 
diligent efforts are being made to deal with grey areas and outright criminality in 
international financial transactions. The Financial Action Task Force on money laundering 
(FATF) was established by the G7 in 1989, and is housed in the OECD Secretariat. After 
years of a discrete and ineffective approach to the problem, the FATF in 2000 took a more 
activist position by naming offenders and creating a "blacklist", annually updated. The 
purpose of this approach is to shame countries into complying with a higher level of 
diligence in preventing money laundering though in principle sanctions against the 
financial companies of these countries are also possible. 
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Four issues remain outstanding. First, the definition of money laundering is left to the 
member countries of the FATF (for example, France considers tax evasion to be money 
laundering, Switzerland does not.) Second, the FATF has directed its highly public efforts 
against small and poor countries, leaving it open to the charge of bending to exigencies. 
Third, there is no common framework within which co-ordinated action may be taken to 
penalize offenders or improve standards of accountability in all countries, not just the worst 
cases. A fourth and no less important issue has to do with linking efforts to curb money 
laundering with another OECD-inspired exercise, to eliminate what it terms "harmful tax 
practices." The Forum on Harmful Tax Practices identifies four factors which would 
constitute a tax haven: no or only nominal effective tax rates; lack of effective exchange of 
information; lack of transparency; and absence of a requirement of substantial activities. In 
June 2001, the US administration convinced the OECD to drop efforts to force offshore tax 
centres to end some of the more egregious aspects of their tax incentives, while continuing 
to work with these countries to provide information to OECD national tax authorities. As a 
result, a blacklist similar to that produced by the FATF is unlikely to be published soon, 
and efforts by some OECD members to link the tax haven and money laundering exercises 
have been temporarily stalled. 
e. Technological Change 
The final pillar of the emerging international financial architecture is less deterministic 
than the ones discussed already. Nevertheless, technological change, mainly in the form of 
more efficient payments systems and the spread of electronic money, is likely to have a 
profound effect on the international financial system. Analytically, this is largely uncharted 
territory. A distinction may be made between electronic money ("e-money") and electronic 
trading systems (ET). 
The BIS defines c-money as "stored value or prepaid products in which a record of the 
funds or value available to the consumer is stored on a device in the consumer's possession" 
(BIS 2000). The principle issues raised by the spread of e-money have to do with its 
scorty imf)1it0r iL ni -eo.mio it1i.. Security concerns dea with 
possible breaches of security for reasons of theft; the possibility that in the absence of well 
run clearing and settlement arrangements c-money will abet money laundering; and the lack 
of clear legal jurisdiction when e-money is used for cross-border payments. The macro- 
economic implications of c-money relate to the likelihood that money velocities may 
change thus making monetary targeting less effective during a transition phase, and the 
reduction in seigniorage revenues caused by a reduction in the amount of notes and coins in 
circulation. 
BIS (2001) defines an ET as a "facility that provides some or all of the following 
services: electronic order routing; automated trade execution; electronic dissemination of 
pre-trade (bid/offer) quotes; and post-trade information." ET systems raise a number of 
issues related to market contestability, efficiency and stability. On contestability, until a 
clear industry standard emerges, there is likely to be fragmentation among such systems 
and a consequent loss in efficiency. The eventual emergence of a monopoly will raise 
efficiency, but its size and nature depends on the regulatory regime that governs it. ET 
systems have the potential to improve the efficiency of individual firms, but it also 
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increases their dependency on the system. The systemic instability impact of ET systems 
depends on their reliability and transparency. 
3. The Domestic Financial Architecture in Developing Countries 
a. The Financial Infrastructure 
The rectangle on the left-hand side of the Scheme lists the elements of the financial 
structure which constitutes the DFA. They are the legal and judiciary infrastructure, the 
regulatory framework, and the host of practices and policies which affect the structure, 
conduct, and performance of financial institutions and corporate governance. The process 
of institutional building and reform, however, is complex and particular attention should be 
paid to some aspects associated with liberalization policies. 
Financial liberalization involves lifting controls on interest rates, deregulation and 
privatization of the banking sector, allowing the entry of foreign capital, and introducing 
international regulatory standards. Hence, it can be interpreted as a wide-ranging attempt to 
re-designing the DFA. But, when we examine financial liberalization using the broadly- 
defined DFA framework, inconsistencies appear. The analysis of liberalization experiences 
suggests that easier reforms (i.e. lifting controls) are introduced quickly while those that 
are politically conflictive and time-consuming are often delayed (for example a more 
transparent and active judiciary). 
Another important issue is the relationship between the legal infrastructure and 
regulations. When the legal system is weak, stronger regulations can act as an effective 
substitute for court enforcement of contracts. But a strong regulator in the context of a 
fragile judiciary may result in widespread corruption. In this regard, consistency is critical 
and it is necessary to avoid a patchwork approach to reform. It would be wiser to advance 
more slowly but in a coherent way. 
in tii \Vc , :cirii:•: rn:y nve fILd lcs of te inco'sistencv between the 
velocity of the processes of institutional development and of deregulation. Rapid 
deregulation in the context of weak legal and judiciary infrastructure and lack of 
transparency may result in the mispricing of risk which, in turn, can lead to financial 
turmoil and sudden increases in national risk. 
b. The Macroeconomic Regime 
The four elements of the macroeconomic regime which are relevant to the DFA are 
the exchange rate, the monetary and the capital account regimes, and the capacity to 
manage non-diversifiable national risk. The literature on the choice of exchange rate 
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regimes and on optimal currency areas4 has clarified the connections between the first three 
elements while the literature on capital markets in open economies deals with the fourth.5 
In choosing an exchange rate regime, the authorities must decide on three key issues: 
first, the desired degree of autonomy of the monetary policy; second, the degree of 
openness of the capital account, which will contribute decisively to determining the 
intensity of capital mobility; and third, the degree of nominal exchange rate flexibility6. If 
there are no restrictions on choice, the authorities might assign monetary policy to domestic 
targets (inflation/unemployment), ensure free capital mobility to facilitate the intertemporal 
allocation of resources and of risk, and set a stable nominal exchange rate to favor the 
stability of the private sector's formation of expectations. The number of "free" parameters 
and variables in the authorities' opportunity set, however, is too limited. The lack of 
degrees of freedom determine the appearance of a trilemma: it is not possible, 
simultaneously, to achieve nominal exchange rate stability, free capital mobility and an 
autonomous monetary policy (Frankel, 1999). Two of these objectives can, at most, be 
consistently pursued. 
The fourth element in the macroeconomic regime rectangle is the capacity to manage 
non-diversifiable national risk. If international credit markets were perfect, developing 
countries would be able to demand any amount of credit at the ongoing international 
interest rate. In such a world, countries would be able to redistribute the effects of external 
shocks across time and states of nature. The authorities could resort to international credit 
markets to stabilize consumption and to finance investment until all profitable opportunities 
are exhausted. Likewise, small countries would be able to diversify a good deal of their 
national risks. The existence of transaction costs, sovereign risk, uncertainty and 
asymmetric information precludes this possibility7. The recent episodes of instability have 
proved that it is very difficult to construct a portfolio for diversifying developing country 
risks. It is very difficult to hold a well-diversified portfolio in a context in which the 
parameters defining the stochastic processes generating the returns of national stocks are 
unstable and the returns tend to become positively correlated when the consequences of a 
See, for example, Frankel and Rose (1996), Frankel (1999), and Edwards and Savastano (1999), Mundell 
(2000), and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997). 
There is no well-developed analytical framework, however, showing the linkages between these four 
elements. That is, risk and intertemporal allocation on the one hand, and the factors associated with the 
exchange rate regime on the other. 
Under a complete market structure, the choice of a specific exchange rate regime is neutral. It has no real 
effects (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996). In a setting characterized by full price flexibility without restrictions on 
the intertemporal allocation of resources and on risk management, the information on the characteristics of the 
existing exchange rate regime would be irrelevant. The rules specified by the authorities to buy and sell 
different currencies and to manage the monetary supply would only be relevant to the equilibrium value of the 
nominal variables. In the real world, markets in developing economies are far from complete and, hence, the 
exchange rate regime matters to the real variables because the nominal magnitudes may affect real ones. In 
developing countries, the choice of the exchange rate regime is limited by the specific structural features of 
both international trade and each country's macroeconomy. 
On the "puzzles" that this situation generates, see Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000 and Heliwell, 2000. 
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crisis in an emerging country's capital market spill over, frequently helped by the irrational 
behavior of investors. 
Risk management and mitigation is an important activity for finns. So is it for policy 
makers in a world of imperfect capital markets. In fact, proficiency in national risk 
management can be just as important to competitive advantage as technology or scale 
economies. But again, the instruments and scope for risk management cannot be assessed in 
isolation from the features of the DFA and IFA. These features can decisively affect the 
number, type and extent of the exposures to risk that a country faces and hence the 
behaviour of national risk. In this regard, an international lender of last resort would be of 
great help in managing national risk, and it is crucial to avoid financial practices and rules 
that increase the economy's vulnerability or to eliminate mechanisms that make fiscal 
policies procyclical. 
III. The DFA, the IFA and the Argentine Economy 
In the last decade, Argentina has introduced major changes in its DFA. It has been an 
active player in emerging capital markets, has maintained fluent relations with international 
financial institutions, has participated in the GATS negotiations in the ambit of the WTO, 
and is one of the founders of Mercosur. It is a good reference point to illustrate and assess 
DFA/IFA interactions. 
In addition to describing the reforms introduced into the Argentine DFA, the primary 
purpose of this section is to identify the channels through which the IFA/DFA interactions 
influence financial stability and deepening. Although we focus on financial issues, there 
will be frequent references to the process of international integration and macroeconomic 
stability in ocder to a' pa;tird eUibrum bii. This bias is often present in the 
literature analyzing changes in specific components of the DFA. For example, the studies 
on the Basel standards tend to concentrate on changes in a bank's risk management 
practices and to ignore the consequences of such changes on firms' capital structure and the 
macroeconomy. To avoid building inconsistencies within the DFA, the design of reform 
policies should be based on a more "systemic" approach. 
1. The DFA, the IFA, and the Reform Program. 
Scheme II presents the main developments and changes in the broadly-defined 
Argentine DFA and in the elements of the IFA which are relevant to analyzing the 
DFAIIFA interactions. We also show the results in terms of the policy goals in the ovals. 
INSERT SCHEME II 
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a. Argentina and the IFA 
The IFA rectangle shows the main linkages between Argentina and the IFA 
institutions. These linkages have influenced both the financial structure and the overall 
macroeconomic evolution. 
The IFA institutions influence domestic financial intermediation through three 
channels - (1) the adoption of the Basel Committee recommendations as a guideline to 
reform banking regulations and supervision; (2) the GATS negotiations on financial 
services; and (3) the pressure of international institutions like the IMF and the WB favoring 
liberalization. Under the WTO Financial Services Agreement, Argentina made 
commitments that can be considered generous. Regarding market access, for example, 
Argentina established fewer limitations than OECD countries (Berlinski, 2001). The 
country completely liberalized foreign financial flows and allowed huge flows of foreign 
direct investment into the banking sector. These factors contributed to changing 
substantially the financial market structure. 
Argentina has traditionally had close ties with the international financial institutions. 
The role of the IMF has been particularly important in providing liquidity in the context of 
the several current account crises. Argentina has resorted to IMF credit facilities very 
frequently and has been almost permanently under the surveillance of the IMF ever since 
the debt crisis in the early eighties. In the nineties, the IMF's help was critical to facing the 
macroeconomic instability during the Tequila crisis in 1994/95 and from 1998 on. 
In December 1999 a program supported with an IMF stand-by credit was launched, 
but the ensuing economic performance was disappointing. Hence, in late 2000 the 
Government launched a revised plan. The IMF raised its financing commitment. In January 
2001, the Fund increased Argentina's existing stand-by credit to $13.7 billion (çart of 
wiich wis pravid dcr thc Suppiemcntzil Rcscrve Facility). The \VB, the 1DB and the 
Spanish Government also contributed with new loans. In addition to macroeconomic goals, 
IMF conditionality embraces the reform of fiscal administration, social security, industrial 
and competition policy, trade policy, the financial sector, and corporate governance. No 
"systemic" study of the consistency of the DFA reforms planned was presented. IMF 
support was critical in helping Argentina avoid default, but it is not clear that the attached 
conditionality will resolve the vicious circle of fiscal adjustment, the fall in the level of 
economic activity, deflation, falling tax yields, and the widening of the fiscal gap. 
The country is an active player in the "new regionalism" (it is one of the founders of 
Mercosur and participates in negotiations in the ambit of NAFTA, EU, and with many 
Latin American countries). The most important changes in the DFA could originate in 
negotiations under the umbrella of Mercosur. The countries in the region are supposed to 
make efforts to coordinate the macroeconomy and to achieve deeper integration of financial 
markets. However, little progress has been made. 
b. The Reform of the Financial Infrastructure 
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The reforms introduced in some segments of the financial infrastructure in the nineties 
were radical. But the changes did not affect all the elements in the "financial infrastructure" 
rectangle of Scheme I in the same way or with similar intensity. While the reforms in 
banking regulations were deep and rapid, there was no progress in the reform of the legal 
and judiciary infrastructure. Neither were there improvements in corporate governance 
arrangements. Although equal treatment of foreign capital was guaranteed, there was no 
progress in the protection of minority shareholders or the monitoring and sanction of 
abusive self-dealing and insider trading. The lack of improvement in the efficiency of the 
"market" for corporate control restrained the deepening in equity and bond markets. 
Traditional features such as family control of corporations, and the tendency for 
multinationals to control its corporate shares has not changed. These developments were at 
odds with another major reform: the establishment of a private pension fund system. The 
reduced stock of private bonds and of stock market capitalization obliged institutional 
investors to hold a disproportionate amount of public debt and bank deposits in their 
portfolios. This is but one example of the inconsistencies that can result from a partial 
approach to DFA reform. 
The liberalization of the banking system in Argentina has been wide-ranging. In 
addition to canonical deregulation measures, dollar-denominated deposits and credit 
operations were permitted from the beginning of the reform. The process, however, showed 
two distinct periods separated by the Tequila Effect. As a consequence of this shock, 
several banks faced severe solvency problems8 and, to improve the reliability of the system, 
the authorities introduced a new regulatory framework. The new framework sought to base 
financial stability on market discipline. The two pillars of the new system were the capital 
adequacy standards and the liquidity requirements system. 
The banks' capital adequacy standards are based on the 1988 Basel Capital Accord. A 
minimum of 11.5% of assets at risk is the standard requirement. There is also a capital 
requirement for credit risk. The indicator of credit risk utilized is the interest rate charged 
on each loan. In 1996 market risk capital requirements were introduced. Argentina was one 
of the fi'.L cr to i pl1ient the mndmen.t to tho 1988 Accord, The "standardized" 
approach was used, which requires the service of a credit rating agency to evaluate risk. 
Capital requirements were further augmented in 1999 to cover interest rate risk on the 
banking book9. 
With the primary goal of protecting systemic liquidity, a new liquidity requirement 
system was implemented in 1995 to replace the existing minimum reserve requirement 
8 
During the Tequila crisis, some wholesale banks with relatively large government bond portfolios or other 
financial market exposures were severely affected by the fall in the price of financial assets. The solvency 
indicators significantly worsened. Other small banks were also affected and, as a consequence, a wave of 
mergers and absorptions followed. 
Calomiris and Powel (2000) present the following expression to calculate capital requirements: 
CR 1 1.5*w*X*K+MR+IR. 
Where, 
CR = Capital requirement as a % of assets at risk; w = average bank Basel risk weight for counterparty risk; 
X average interest rate factor (the interest rate on each loan is used as an indicator of counterparty risk); K= 
Camels factor; MR= market risk capital requirement; JR interest rate risk (banking book) capital requirement. 
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scheme. Liquidity requirements were defined on virtually all liabilities, although the rates 
declined as the maturity of the liability increased. Reserves were remunerated at rates 
similar to short-term dollar interest rates. The system was subsequently modified to permit 
the holding of balances in qualifying foreign banks and the use of standbys from foreign 
banks. The purpose was to reduce the implicit tax burden on banks that a liquidity 
requirement implies. 
In addition to this increase in capital and liquidity requirements, other measures were 
implemented to improve solvency and information. In 1992, a main debtors' database was 
created, the provisioning requirements were substantially tightened after the Tequila crisis; 
and, in 1997/1998 a plan to oversee banks based on the BASIC system was implemented.'° 
Substantial changes in the market structure and conduct of banks were observed 
after the implementation of these banking sector regulations. The most remarkable 
development was the improvement in the management and capitalization of banks. This, 
however, did not result in a better overall performance of the banking sector. The banking 
sector faced increasing difficulties to play the basic role of increasing the supply of credit to 
the private sector and improving the allocation process. As we will see, the amount of 
credit allocated to the private sector stagnated and there was a crowding out process as the 
government demand for financing increased. Although these disappointing features are in 
part explained by the pervasive recessionary process, the recession itself may have been 
exacerbated by the developments on the financial side. Given the importance of these issues 
for an assessment of the changes introduced in the DFA we examine below in more detail, 
first, the effects on the banking sector and, then, on the firm's balance sheets. 
The reforms set in motion a process of deep changes in the banking market 
structure. Two salient features are the increase in the concentration of ownership and a 
higher participation of foreign banks. The participation of foreign banks in total credit and 
deposits rose from around 16% in 1994 to almost 50% in 2000. In contrast, the proportion 
corresponding to both smaller private banks and public banks fell. The process of 
conCcihiaaOn was nc less profuLInJ. In 19O, the tep ten bnhs .ccountd for 0°/ of total 
deposits and, in 2000, the share grew to 70%. The concentration is higher regarding credit, 
where the top ten banks accounts for 80%. To a certain extent, these results have been 
policy-induced. The process of mergers and acquisition that followed the Tequila crisis was 
promoted by the Central Bank and multilateral institutions. The process was assisted 
through the use of a Fiduciary Fund set up in 1995; 24 Provincial banks were privatized. 
The new and tighter prudential regulations induced changes in lending practices which, 
in turn, affected the sectoral allocation of credit. The most relevant effects were the 
'° BASIC is an acronym. B Bonds, the bank must issue a subordinated liability for some 2% of their 
deposits each year. This did not work well because the Asian crisis made debt issues difficult. A Auditing. 
A list of qualified bank auditors who must post a financial bond. S = Supervision. The Superintendency 
adopted a version of the US CAMELS system of bank rating and so the bank's CAMELS ratings are used in 
several regulations. 1= Information. Disclosure rules for banks are set. C = Credit Rating. Each bank must 
obtain a credit-rating from an internationally active authorized rating agency (there are four). The idea is to 
ensure that public information is available to less sophisticated investors. BASiC was proven not to be 
problem-free. See Calomiris and Powel (2000) for a detailed explanation. 
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increment in the proportion of loans allocated to the public sector and a high participation 
of larger loans in the credit supply. Some specific features of the capital adequacy 
requirements may have contributed to these results. First, capital requirement may be 
biased in favor of the allocation of funds to the public sector. While a minimum of 11.5% 
of assets at risk is required in the case of the private sector, the requirement for the 
government component of assets is much lower (between 1 and 5%). Besides, no 
provisioning is required for credits to the public sector. Second, the evaluation of credit risk 
as a function of the interest rate charged on loans may introduce a bias against smaller 
firms. In the case of small-scale borrowers, higher rates may reflect higher administrative 
costs rather than higher risk. Third, the increase in capital requirements may have created a 
competitive advantage favoring foreign banks. Many national banks were unable to raise 
domestic capital to increase their capitalization. Many small retail domestic banks, with 
well-established customer relationships with small firms, disappeared or were absorbed by 
larger banks, specially after the Tequila crises. Frequently, this entailed the loss of the stock 
of information accumulated and smaller firms faced increased difficulties to access credit 
markets. This hypothesis is consistent with the elevated concentration of loans now 
observed. According to the main debtors' database, one percent of the total number of loans 
absorbs 60% of credit. Fourth, after the tightening of prudential regulations, there is a 
tendency for the banks to reduce the proportion of their assets at risk as a proportion of total 
assets. Despite this reduction there was an increment in the participation of non-performing 
loans in the recent years. As a consequence, solvency indicators worsened. The non- 
performing loans (net of provisioning) as a proportion of banks' net worth increased in the 
last years from around 20% in 1998 to 24.5 % in 2000. 
c. The Changes in the Macroeconomic Regime 
As the rectangle corresponding to the macroeconomic regime shows, the most relevant 
modifications were the implementation of the Convertibility program (which put in force a 
currency board-like regime in 1991)11, and the complete deregulation of the capital account. 
In fact, to reinforce Convertibility, in 1992 a new Central Bank charter establishing the o of t.: Ce:tr1 B: th hn:inc STntendncy (as a semi-autonomous 
unit) was passed. Rediscounts were severely restricted and there was no deposit 
insurance.12 In effect, to face the trilemma, the authorities renounced their autonomy over 
monetary policy. 
The country has maintained this macroeconomic regime for more than ten years. The 
most remarkable result of the Convertibility Regime was the reduction in the inflation rate. 
Under Convertibility Argentina ceased to be a high-inflation country. Today, the rate of 
inflation is well below international standards and, recently, the country has began to 
experience deflation. Another important fact is that although the economy's average rate of 
growth was considerable in the nineties (4.1% per year), sustained growth is far from 
The peso was pegged to the U.S. dollar and the parity was fixed at one peso per dollar. It was established 
that the Central Bank would hold an amount of international reserves that would at least be equal to the 
currency in circulation. 
12 As a consequence of the Tequila effect, the Congress approved various modifications that softened the 
restrictions on rediscounts, and a deposit insurance scheme was created. The limit of coverage is $30.000. 
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assured and the country is presently suffering from a painful recessionary period that has 
lasted for more than three years. 
In fact, the above-mentioned average growth rate is the result of two completely 
different periods, separated by the Tequila effect in 1995. In the first years of the reform, 
the increase in GDP was strong. But, after 1995, the evolution of the economy showed 
several disappointing features: The activity level followed a stop-and-go pattern; the 
average increase in GDP was low; and, the unemployment rate soared. Likewise, the fiscal 
deficit and the stock of the external debt experienced an upward trend. As a consequence, 
Argentina began to face increasing difficulties to meet its external obligations and 
ultimately was forced to resort to the IMF, as was described above. At this time, the 
financial aid has not been sufficient to eliminate financial instability. In fact, today the 
country is facing a very difficult financial and macroeconomic situation, characterized by 
high interest rates, deflation and a persistent recession. 
The stop-and-go pattern followed by macroeconomic aggregates, together with the 
inability to stabilize the economy, even in the presence of special multilateral financial 
help, suggests that the reforms introduced in the macroeconomic regime did not enhance 
the capacity to manage national risk. This inability has had consequences on the evolution 
of both financial intermediaries' and firms' balance sheets. Likewise, the inability to 
manage national risk resulted in an increase in volatility and the perverse feedback channel 
between volatility and financial sector stability was activated. This may jeopardize the 
progress made in reforming the regulatory framework. On the other hand, it is also possible 
that the timing and intensity of the reforms contributed to worsening the recession and to 
deepening the difficulties on the real side. 
2. Financial Stability and Deepening 
a. Financial deepening 
Tii reforn in the DFA contributed siniflnly to chinging the financial scenario 
inherited from the so-called "lost decade" of the eighties. In 1991, the economy's degree of 
financial deepening was very low. Total deposits amounted to around 5% of GDP. The 
stabilization of the nominal exchange rate and disinflation under Convertibility greatly 
favored the recovery in the demand for domestic assets. This recovery was additionally 
strengthened by the substantial improvement in emerging capital markets and the 
deregulation of the capital account. Figure 1 shows the continuos improvement in financial 
deepening in the 1991-94 period as measured by the increase in the demand for deposits 
and total credit. These developments softened the tight credit rationing of the eighties and 
opened up new opportunities for the firms to innovate in the form of financing capital 
projects. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
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This process of increasing financial deepening has certain features. First, there has 
been an increasing dollarization of portfolios. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the stock of 
dollar-denominated credit and deposits in the domestic financial system as a proportion of 
the total stock of credit and deposits. As can be seen, the proportion of dollar-denominated 
instruments grew continuously. At the end of 2000 more than 60% of credits and deposits 
were denominated in dollars. However, the proportion of dollarized credit is greater than 
the proportion of deposits. This implies that, in fact, banks are hedged against a devaluation 
of the currency. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
A second feature is that the evolution of the demand for domestic assets proved to be 
highly dependent on external conditions. As can be seen in Figure 1, external shocks 
impacted rapidly on the demand for domestic assets and the credit supply. The Mexican 
crisis interrupted the upward trend in deposits and credit. After the recovery in 1996/97, the 
Russian crisis had the same effect. Note that the speed of the recovery in deposits and 
credit is very different after the Tequila and the Russian shocks. While the recovery is very 
rapid in the fon-ner case, credits and deposits show a much more sluggish evolution in the 
latter. In fact, the worsening of financial conditions in 2001 resulted in a fall in the stock of 
deposits. 
External shocks also influenced the cost of domestic credit. The main link between 
external and domestic credit markets is the country risk premium. Changes in the 
conditions in emerging countries' capital markets andlor in the domestic macroeconomic 
scenario are reflected immediately in changes in the country risk premium. The volatility of 
both domestic and external conditions echoed in the evolution of the country risk. Via its 
in1:ice on te cort of credit, tiis voatiiity increased the v.riance of oggregate demand. 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the country risk premium as measured by the EMBI spread 
and compares it with the economy's quarterly rate of growth. Both variables show high 
volatility and there is a marked and negative association between changes in the country 
risk premium and changes in the growth rate of quarterly GDP. A simple regression 
exercise (Fanelli, 2001) shows that each percentage point of increase in the country risk 
premium is associated with a one percentage point fall in the annual growth rate. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 
The third feature is the close association between the supply of credit and the activity 
level. Indeed, given that Argentina's capital markets are far from perfect, it seems plausible 
that changes in the availability of credit does matter to the level of activity. Using an error 
correction model, Fanelli and Keifman (1999) find results which are consistent with the 
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hypotheses of an influence of credit on output in the short run and of a negative correlation 
between the country risk premium and the evolution of the macroeconomy. 
In sum, these data suggest that under the DFA which resulted from the nineties 
reforms, the money and credit supplies are to a great extent passively determined by the 
evolution of the demand for domestic assets. This, in turn, creates a close association 
between capital inflows, the generation of credit, and the activity level. This association is a 
potential source of macroeconomic and financial uncertainty, as international capital flows 
into emerging countries are far from stable. 
It must be taken into account, nonetheless, that the economic authorities' degrees of 
freedom under Convertibility are not equal to zero. In fact, it seems that the depth of the 
recession since 1998 may not have been independent of some policy actions on the fiscal 
side and the reforms in prudential regulations. Specifically, there has been a persistent 
tendency for the rate of growth of credit to lag behind the rate of growth of deposits since 
1995. In fact, in 1999 the line representing deposits crosses the credit line (Figure 1). The 
tightening in prudential and liquidity regulations of the Central Bank in the second part of 
the nineties may be associated with this result. 
But, in fact, the credit squeeze in the private sector since 1998 has been stronger than 
what is suggested in Figure 1. The Figure clearly shows that the aggregate stock of credit as 
a proportion of GDP has stagnated since 1998. But the aggregate conceals the fall in the 
stock of private credit that was offset by an increase in the amount of public sector credit 
demand. The increase in the fiscal deficit from 1998 (which was associated with the 
political cycle) raised the public sector's borrowing needs and, as a consequence, the 
government crowded out the private sector. The private/public credit ratio fell from 7.7 
when the Russian crisis hit the economy in 1998 to 4.4 at the end of 2000. 
The funds available for financing the private sector suffered, simultaneously, from the 
pressure exerted by the fall in capital inflows, the tightening in prudential regulations, and a 
riounting public sector dmrtnd for credit. In such context, it is not surprising that the 
demand for investment and consumer durables, which is a major factor behind the present 
stagnation of aggregate demand plummeted. This feature of the Argentine experience 
shows that a systemic approach to reform may be useful. A tightening of regulations can be 
self-defeating if effective demand is falling and the emerging capital markets' conditions 
are worsening. It can jeopardize the banks solvency if the firms' financial fragility 
increases. To assess the plausibility of this hypothesis we examine the evolution of the 
balance sheets of a panel of firms. 
b. The Firms 
Figure 4 show the evolution of the capital structure of Argentine firms listed on the 
Stock Exchange. In the nineties, there is a clear tendency for the level of leverage to 
increase. This tendency is very marked: In the 1992:1 /2000:111 period, net worth increased 
by 22% in real terms while total debt grew by 22 1%. 
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INSERT FIGURE 4 
It would be very difficult to understand why there was such an important growth in 
indebtedness in the nineties without referring to macroeconomic factors and the changes in 
the DFA. In the early nineties, following two hyperinflationary episodes in 1989 and 1990, 
foreign capital markets were closed to most Argentine firms and the domestic credit/GDP 
ratio was extremely low. Under such circumstances, it seems logical to assume that firms 
were in disequilibrium and that the observed leverage ratio did not reflect long-run 
equilibrium values. As stability consolidated in the nineties and capital inflows recovered, 
the firms sought to reduce the gap between existing and preferred levels of leverage. In 
order to highlight the relevance of macroeconomic factors to microeconomic decisions we 
draw the observed values of the gearing ratio (debt over total assets) against its "medium- 
run" trend (using the H-P filter) in Figure 513 
INSERT FIGURE 5 
Substantial deviations from the trend are associated with major macroeconomic 
shocks. The two largest downward deviations coincide with the hyperinflationary period 
and with the Tequila effect. In both cases, nonetheless, as the effects of shocks faded, the 
gearing ratio recovered rapidly. Notice particularly the years of booming capital inflows 
(1992-94). 
INSERT FIGURE 6 
Figure 6 shows the evolution of long- and short-term debt. By comparing Figures 5 
and 6, we can see that the behavior of the long-term liabilities/asset ratio tends to mimic 
the behavior of the gearing ratio. But the fluctuations of the latter ratio are smoother. This 
implies that agents tend to resort to short-term debt when they face either increasing costs 
in the markets for long-term debt or rationing. 
The reference to the trend is only illustrative. It follows from our arguments in the text that, after 
hyperinflation and stabilization, the Argentine economy is at present in a period of adjustment. 
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Under Convertibility, the stock of short-term debt held by firms is higher than that of 
long-term debt during almost all of the sample period and their proportion is comparable to 
other developing countries (Booth et. al., 2000). The telling presence of instruments with 
short maturity implies that staged finance is a feature characterizing Argentina's 
debtor/creditor relationships (Stulz, 2000). 
INSERT FIGURE 7 
Figure 7 shows the co-movement of the proportions of short- and long-term debt in 
total debt. As can be seen the gap between the two variables tends to augment in 
recessionary periods and to diminish in expansionary ones. This implies that the ratio 
between short- and long-term liabilities tends to move pro-cyclically and, therefore, that 
negative shocks not only reduce leverage but also tend to shorten the duration of debt. 
If average maturity falls during downturns firms should increase their demand for 
liquid assets to maintain their liquidity position (i.e. to keep the liquid assets/short-term 
debt ratio constant). The available evidence, however, points against this hypothesis. It 
seems that in the Argentine case, the firms' liquidity position tends to worsen in periods of 
macroeconomic instability. To illustrate this point, Figure 8 compares the evolution of 
liquidity (liquid assets/short-term liabilities) with the evolution of country risk, which is 
interpreted as a proxy for macroeconomic disequilibrium. The behavior of these two series 
is compatible with the conjecture that, under Convertibility, liquidity constraints move pro- 
cyclically'4. 
INSERT FIGURE 8 
The increase in the proportion of dollar-denominated liabilities under Convertibility 
that we observed at the aggregate level is also clear in the firm panel. The proportion of 
dollar-denominated debt in total debt rose from 52 % in 1992 to 77% in 2000 (Figure 9). 
This figure suggests that the growth rate of dollar-denominated debt was even higher than 
the rate corresponding to total liabilities which, as was mentioned, was very high: In the 
1992:1/2000:111 period the total amount of dollar-denominated debt almost quadrupled. 
It is interesting to note, in this regard, that liquidity conditions seem to respond very quickly to changes in 
foreign capital markets. Notice, for example in Figure 8, that the worsening in liquidity conditions occurs 
well before the Tequila effect hit the economy. In fact, there is a clear worsening in the liquidity indicator 
after the tightening of monetary policy in the USA in the first quarter of 1994. This suggests that the Tequila 
and the change of orientation in monetary policy in the USA are not independent phenomena. 
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INSERT FIGURE 9 
There is a close link in the evolution of dollar-denominated and long-term liabilities 
which suggests that for Argentine firms, domestic dollar-denominated credit and external 
capital markets are critical sources of long-run funds. Under the assumption that firms 
prefer to match the duration of their assets and liabilities, dollarization and capital inflows 
must have had a positive influence on capital formation. However, it is also true that as the 
proportion of dollar-denominated liabilities increases, so does the exposure to 
unanticipated changes in the real exchange rate. Hence, there is a trade-off between the 
benefits of matching the duration of the two sides of the balance sheet and the increased 
currency risk taken because of higher mismatching in the currency-denomination of assets 
and liabilities. The existence of currency risk implies an inverse relationship between the 
expectations of a change in the real exchange rate and the degree of currency mismatch 
between assets and liabilities. 
If this argument is valid, every time the firms seek to hedge against devaluation, the 
share of long-run liabilities in the firms' balance sheets will tend to fall. Figure 10 presents 
evidence that this conjecture merits investigating in the Argentine case. We plot the ratio 
between short- and long-term debt against the ratio between dollar-denominated liabilities 
and assets. 
INSERT FIGURE 10 
An inspection of Figure 10 reveals significant declines in dollar-denominated 
liabilities and a rise in the importance of short-term debt every time an important shock, be 
it domestic or external, hits the economy. Specifically, notice the widening u1 IjIC gap 
between the two variables during hyperinflation (1989/90), the Tequila (1955/96) and after 
the Russian/Brazilian turmoils (1998/99). 
c. Lessons 
In sum, the dynamics of short- and long-term debt held by firms throughout the cycle 
suggest a series of stylized facts that should be taken into account in assessing the effects of 
the reforms in the DFA. 
In the first place, credit conditions can react quickly to changes in investor sentiment 
and, hence, the evolution of overall volatility and national risk is highly relevant. The 
fluctuations in leverage suggest that negative shocks tend to worsen credit conditions 
rapidly, driving firms' leverage to sub-optimal levels. Firms may have to resort to liquidate 
assets to smooth the effects of short-run credit crunches. In contrast, firms take advantage 
of "tranquil" periods in credit markets to correct deviations from long-run equilibrium. 
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Second, macroeconomic shocks play a significant role in explaining Argentina's 
dollarization. In Argentina, agents must take financing decisions in a highly uncertain 
environment in which substantial wealth losses can result from errors in expectations. 
When a fiscal or an external shock leads to an unexpected currency devaluation (and, 
eventually, to a change of the exchange rate regime), those agents facing severe losses 
typically feel as if the authorities had violated their property rights. This fear of losses and 
the need to "protect property rights" from moral hazard is behind the economy's tendency 
to dollarize which is observed under increasing macroeconomic instability. 
Third, when the macroeconomic setting worsens there is, simultaneously, a shift 
toward the demand for foreign exchange and a mounting demand for short term financing. 
Hence, economic downturns create pressures on both foreign exchange and domestic 
financial markets. When the exogenous macroeconomic shock is strong enough and the 
regulatory framework is weak, this combination of events can trigger the so-called "twin 
crises" which, in fact, have occurred in Argentina. Domestic markets for short-term credit 
are unable to make up for the fall in dollar-denominated and long-run loans and firms face 
increasing difficulties to meet their short-run obligations 
Fourth, the behavior of the different debt components throughout the cycle suggest a 
channel through which instability can jeopardize the reforms of prudential regulations. 
Negative shocks reduce the firms' net worth, increasing the probability of financial distress. 
A regression exercise shows that a one-percentage-point increase in the country risk 
premium reduces the value of firms listed on the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange by 2.2 
percentage points (Fanelli, 2001). Under such circumstances, creditors react by shifting 
their demand toward assets with short-term maturity to better monitor the behavior of 
debtors and because the liquidity premium rises in uncertain environments. But, if we 
assume that the duration of assets is somewhat constant throughout the cycle, when the 
shortening in the term to maturity of debt occurs, the firms' financial position further 
deteriorates and default becomes more probable. This increase is perceived by creditors as 
an upward movement in the costs of financial distress (if we calculate these costs as the 
:obibity of f:u1t tnies it.s ccs). Under t1'se circumstances, a logical result is that 
creditors will try to shorten maturity to better monitor and discipline debtors. If this 
reasoning holds, there are endogenous factors which tend to reduce maturity and increase 
financial duress during recessionary periods. This hypothesis of maturity-shortening as a 
disciplinary device is fully consistent with the hypothesis of staged finance as an anti-moral 
hazard mechanism in contexts where institutional underdevelopment impedes the precise 
definition of property rights. 
Fifth, a well-managed and well-capitalized banking system is a requisite for avoiding 
systemic economic and financial crises but it is not a sufficient condition. The ability of 
banks to manage risk and the moral hazard problem depends on their ability to measure 
and mitigate their own exposure, as well as the sufficiency of their equity capital. A 
systemic view takes into account that banks are essentially shock absorbers because 
commercial banks are in the business of managing credit risk Even if the bank is well 
managed, it will absorb errors in risk management made elsewhere in the system and/or 
errors in expectations due to unexpected global or domestic shocks. The evolution of 
Argentine firms' balance sheets shows us that aggregate shocks can rapidly deteriorate their 
financial position. If firms become vulnerable, banking books can become insolvent when 
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the prices of assets fall and are marked to market. Fair market prices are dependent upon 
market liquidity and cash flow. Once the liquidity begins to dry up assets may have to be 
sold at liquidation prices in order to obtain liquidity (Sheng, 2000). 
Sixth, the phenomenon of risk migration is closely related to this issue. Risk tends to 
migrate in the financial system because hedging does not reduce systemic risk. It only 
transfers the exposure elsewhere or transforms the type of the exposure. Because of risk 
migration, activities such as hedging do not reduce the amount of systemic risk. This is 
very important in the case of Argentina. When the level of perceived systemic risk 
increases, banks hedge against currency risk and seek a better matching of the duration of 
assets and liabilities. The counterpart of this, as we have seen, is that firms' liquidity falls 
and the duration of their liabilities shorten during downturns. This augments the firms' 
vulnerability, increasing counter party risk. The ultimate effect of the banks' attempt to 
hedge is that risk migrates from currency risk to credit risk. And the greater the amount of 
risk mitigation by banks, the more likely it is that unforeseen losses will migrate quickly 
from one market to another. As risk migrates through the system it tends to emerge in its 
most basic form, as credit risk (Kimbal, 2000). When one takes into account the 
phenomenon of risk migration and it effects on banks solvency, the Calomiris and Powel 
(2000) argument about market discipline seems weaker. They argue that tight credit supply 
during downturn is a sign of the financial system's strength because tight credit supply in 
the face of a recession and high loan losses is precisely what one would expect from a 
banking system that is subject to market discipline. The Argentine case suggests that in the 
context of a generally weak economic system, a financial sector is no more healthy if it 
simply transfers its risk to firms, because this too rebounds on it. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
As Aliber (2000) points out, a principal difference between the current debate over IFA 
and its analog of the 1960s (then called international monetary reform) is in the unity of 
purpose. In the 1960s, the goal was for Germany, Japan and some other countries to 
expand their reserve holdings without the US having to run a persistent payments deficit. 
In the current debate, problem identification lies in four areas which are at least partially 
exclusive - volatile capital flows; inadequate financial sector regulation; inappropriate 
exchange rate regimes; and lack of an international lender of last resort. 
The emerging IFA in effect reflects views two and three. Key constituents of the 
international financial system, particularly in developing countries, grapple with the 
existence of problems 1 and 4 as well. So one critique of the emerging IFA is that it is not 
comprehensive in addressing the spectrum of problems faced by the international financial 
system. As a result, DFAs, particularly in developing countries, may be incompatible with 
the IFA while being consistent with the domestic situation at hand. Put another way, while 
the emerging IFA may decrease risk globally, this risk is also being shifted. In the absence 
of any meaningful implementation of improved governance of lenders, or the introduction 
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of debt standstills and collective action clauses, the burden of "improving" the IFA falls on 
those least equipped to do so. 
Despite the promises of a new IFA, an "unfriendly" international setting for many 
developing countries in the future is not improbable. This is becoming a source of 
uncertainty and disequilibria per se and constitutes a substantial obstacle to financial 
development because financial intermediation is particularly vulnerable to uncertainty. 
Furthermore, since financial intermediation plays a critical role in resource and risk 
allocation and in supporting macroeconomic stability, the disequilibria on the financial side 
tend to spill over the whole economy via the effects on credit risk and liquidity constraints. 
The design of a coherent strategy articulating the different international initiatives that 
affect the developing countries' DFA with national reform efforts would greatly help to 
overcome this situation. The evidence analyzed in this paper suggest that, to that purpose, it 
is important to adopt a systemic view of the DFA reform. 
An important advantage of this approach is that it stresses the need to preserve the 
overall consistency of the reform. This applies to both the "internal" consistency of the 
different DFA components and the "external" consistency between the DFA and the IFA. 
Likewise, the approach calls for a comprehensive evaluation of the effects of the changes 
in the DFA that embraces not only financial institutions but also macroeconomic stability 
and the country's ability to reap the benefits of trade in international assets. It does not limit 
the monitoring of the reform to oversee the performance indicators of financial institutions. 
It also gives special consideration to the effects on firms' balance sheets; to the interactions 
between solvency, liquidity, national risk, and cyclical fluctuations; and to the problem of 
risk migration. The analysis of the Argentine case illustrates the importance of these 
factors. 
Two policy implications follow from the systemic approach. On the domestic side, it 
calls attention to the danger of the patchwork approach to reform and advocates a careful 
design nd sequencing of the measures 'ffecting different segments of the DFA. On the 
international side, it calls for a symmetric view of the problem of systemic instability in 
emerging capital markets. To avoid asymmetry, not only is it necessary to focus on what 
national institutions should do but also to take into account the key role international 
financial institutions play. 
An internally and externally consistent financial architecture could greatly contribute to 
deactivating the feedback mechanism that links macroeconomic volatility and shallow 
financial markets. Argentina is an example of how destructive this feedback can be. The 
Argentine case shows that the difficulties in managing national risk and the subsequent 
effects on firms and bank balance sheets can jeopardize the best-designed DFA reforms. 
But consistency is more than the "application" at the domestic level of the principles 
and strictures of the IFA. Pistor (2000) argues that while the "supply of well-designed laws 
from the outside" is a key feature of many international organizations particularly in the 
financial arena, "for developing effective legal systems, the contents of the supplied laws is 
of only secondary importance to the process of law development and the compatibility of 
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the new laws with pre-existing conditions." An important feature of the emerging IFA if it 
is to succeed in being accepted everywhere is precisely attention to local conditions. 
The most important service that the IFI can pay to the consistency between the IFA and 
the DFA is to help countries diversify national risk and manage liquidity under 
circumstances of financial distress. The literature on international risk-sharing tends to 
emphasize the analysis of the potential welfare gains of consumption smoothing. But this 
literature frequently assumes implicitly that domestic risk-sharing opportunities have been 
exhausted, that there are no liquidity problems, and that the probability distributions of 
returns are stable and known. Under highly imperfect markets and volatility these are not 
good assumptions. It is difficult to hedge risk and macroeconomic shocks create severe 
liquidity constraints and instability in the probability distributions. Hence, better access to 
instruments to diversify national income risk would permit consumption smoothing. But it 
would also significantly improve the functioning of the financial market, thereby 
facilitating the exploitation of domestic opportunities to share risk optimally and to manage 
liquidity. This means that the welfare gains would be much higher than the literature 
suggests. 
The analysis of the Argentine experience presents important lessons regarding the 
internal consistency of the DFA. One obstacle to the success of the DFA reform in the 
Argentine case was the lack of coherence in the design and implementation of reform 
policies. While some segments of the DFA were radically transformed, others remain 
practically intact. The supervision and regulation framework of the banking sector 
improved significantly and the currency board prevented the government from 
implementing misleading monetary policies. But, there was a lack of transparency in other 
segments of the capital markets; corruption was widespread (including allegations of 
money laundering and the use of the financial system as a vehicle for tax evasion). 
In this way, the old problem of sequencing appears again. In fact, Argentina is an 
interesting case in which there was an attempt to substitute the lack of transparency in the 
Irgal fror.overk ar-cl policy iraking vtb stronger regulations. Ultimately, this attempt 
imposed substantial costs on firms and investors and led to stagnation. 
Although Calomiris and Powel (2000) argue that "Argentina's bank regulatory system 
now is widely regarded as one of the two or three most successful among emerging market 
economies", the fact is that the reform suffered from the patchwork syndrome. As the 
present difficulties have demonstrated, years of reforms have corrected severe flaws in the 
financial infrastructure. The new prudential regulations helped to a certain extent to protect 
the solvency of the financial system under the stressful circumstances of the last three 
years. 
Our analysis suggests that the IFA efforts should concentrate on building mechanisms 
for liquidity provision under stress, to help diversify individual country risk, and to build 
institutions that consider the need to preserve the consistency between the DFA and the 
IFA. The evidence for the links between financial sector liberalization and growth is so 
weak, and the links between weak institutions and unfavourable financial flows so strong 
(Wyplosz, 2001; and Wei and Wu, 2001) that going anywhere beyond these core features 
compels a dangerous imbalance between what an IFA intends to achieve and what will 
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result. There is every likelihood that in the short run, at least, the IFA leads to instability, 
contraction or both in developing countries, so minimizing these effects while positioning 
to reap the longer term advantages inherent in the IFA is of utmost importance. 
For an effective DFA to be implemented, the most important lesson is to avoid the 
patchwork approach to reform and to concentrate on institutional building. In Latin 
American countries, transaction costs matter - a lot. In this regard, the DFA should be built 
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